姓名：陈婧

职称：教授

邮箱：jchencs@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn

教育背景

工学学士，计算机科学与技术，清华大学，2004

工学硕士，计算机科学与技术，清华大学，2007

博士，计算机科学，麻省理工学院，2012

社会兼职

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC): Associate Editor, 2021-present.

研究领域

计算理论、算法博弈论、机制设计、区块链和分布式账本

研究概况

 我的研究工作的一个重要主题是多实体之间的交互，这一主题贯穿了我的大多数工作，从算法博弈论到分布式账本。与运行单机算法的独立的计算机系统不同，今天的大规模计算机系统和网络经常有很多参与者在分布式的环境中进行交互，电子商务、社交网络、多智能体系统、区块链等等都是如此。这些系统的参与者可能是人也可能是人工智能，可能是个体也可能是大型公司、机构，不同的参与者在同一个系统中的目的也各不相同。我的研究工作旨在设计这样的系统，用严格的理论来刻画参与者的行为，并特别关注其中的计算效率、经济效率、健壮性等等问题，使得系统不仅能高效地运行，而且能够在不理想、不友好的环境中仍然保持安全和健壮。

奖励与荣誉

NSF CAREER Award, 2016

学术成果

1. Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. J. Chen, B. Li, Y. Li, and P. Lu. Journal of Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), Vol. 303, 2022, 103630.

2. Small Profits and Quick Returns: An Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing under Continuous Platform Competition. D. Baek, J. Chen, B. J. Choi. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1, pp. 349 – 362, 2020.

3. Algorand: A secure and efficient distributed ledger. J. Chen and S. Micali. Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), Vol. 777, pp. 155-183, 2019.

4. Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem. J. Chen, B. Li, and Y. Li. SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 373–416, 2019.

5. Reinforcement Learning based Schemes to Manage Client Activities in Large Distributed Control Systems. Y. Gao, J. Chen, T. Robertazzi, and K. A. Brown. Physical Review Accelerators and Beams (PRAB), Vol. 22, Iss. 1, Article 014601, 2019.

6. Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences. H. Chan, J. Chen, and G. Srinivasan. Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Vol. 5, Iss. 2, Article 12, 2017.

7. Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions. J. Chen and S. Micali. Games, Special Issue on Epistemic Game Theory and Logic, Vol. 7, Iss. 32, 2016.

8. Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare. M. Braverman, J. Chen, and S. Kannan. Mathematics of Operations Research (MOR), Vol. 41, Iss. 1, pp. 352 - 376, 2016.

9. Tight Revenue Bounds with Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality. J. Chen, S. Micali, and R. Pass. Econometrica, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 1619-1639, 2015.

10. Mechanism Design with Possibilistic Beliefs. J. Chen and S. Micali. Journal of Economic Theory (JET), invited to the special issue dedicated to the interface between Economics and Computer Science, Vol. 156, pp. 77-102, 2015.

11. The Robustness of Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games. J. Chen and A. Zinger. Journal of Theoretical Biology (JTB), Vol. 357, pp. 46–54, 2014.

12. The Order Independence of Iterated Dominance in Extensive Games. J. Chen and S. Micali. Theoretical Economics (TE), Vol. 8, pp. 125-163, 2013.

13. Collusive Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness. J. Chen and S. Micali. Journal of Economic Theory (JET), Vol. 147, Iss. 3, pp. 1300-1312, 2012.

14. A New Framework to the Design and Analysis of Identity-Based Identification Schemes. G. Yang, J. Chen, D. Wong, X. Deng, and D. Wang. Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), Vol. 407, Iss. 1-3, pp. 370-388, 2008.

15. Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries. J. Chen and B. Li. 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pp. 486-503, 2021.

16. Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs. J. Chen, S. McCauley and Shikha Singh. 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), pp. 29:1-29:16, 2019.

17. Towards a Verified Model of the Algorand Consensus Protocol in Coq. M. A. Alturki, J. Chen, V. Luchangco, B. Moore, K. Palmskog, L. Peña and G. Roşu. 1st Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC), 2019.

18. Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Goods. H. Chan, J. Chen, B. Li and X. Wu. 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 137–143, 2019. Extended abstract appeared at AAMAS 2019.

19. Approximately Maximizing the Broker’s Profit in a Two-sided Market. J. Chen, B. Li and Y. Li. 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 151–157, 2019.

20. Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions. J. Chen, B. Li, and Y. Li. 11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), pp. 43-55, 2018.

21. Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees. J. Chen, S. McCauley, and S. Singh. 11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), pp. 150-162, 2018.

22. Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. J. Chen, B. Li, Y. Li and P. Lu. International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), 108:1-108:4, 2018.

23. A success-history based learning procedure to optimize server throughput in large distributed control systems. Y. Gao, J. Chen, T. Robertazzi, and K. A. Brown. 16th International Conference on Accelerator and Large Experimental Physics Control Systems (ICALEPCS), 2017.

24. Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem. J. Chen, B. Li, and Y. Li. 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), 11:1-11:15, 2017.

25. Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences. H. Chan and J. Chen. 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 278-286, 2016.

Presented at the 26th International Conference on Game Theory, 2015.

26. Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Dealers. H. Chan and J. Chen. 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 113-122, 2016.

27. Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers. J. Chen, S. McCauley, and S. Singh. 7th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 237-248, 2016.

28. Auction Revenue in the General Spiteful-Utility Model. J. Chen and S. Micali. 7th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 201-211, 2016.

29. Better Outcomes from More Rationality. J. Chen, S. Micali, and R. Pass. 6th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 325-325, 2015.

30. Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets. H. Chan and J. Chen. 10th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), pp. 89-105, 2014.

31. Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare. M. Braverman, J. Chen, and S. Kannan. 5th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 541-542, 2014.

32. Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs. J. Chen and S. Micali. 52nd Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 87-96, 2011.

33. Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions. P. Azar, J. Chen, and S. Micali. 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 236-248, 2012.

34. Robust Perfect Revenue from Perfectly Informed Players. J. Chen, A. Hassidim, and S. Micali. 1st Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 94-105, 2010.

35. Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions. J. Chen, S. Micali, and P. Valiant. 1st Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 81-93, 2010.

36. A New Approach to Auctions and Resilient Mechanism Design. J. Chen and S. Micali. 41st Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 503-512, 2009.

37. A More Natural Way to Construct Identity-Based Identification Schemes. G. Yang, J. Chen, D. Wong, X. Deng, and D. Wang. Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS), pp. 307-322, 2007.

38. Malicious KGC Attack in Certificateless Cryptography. M. H. Au, J. Chen, J. K. Liu, Y. Mu, D. Wong, and G. Yang. 2nd Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS), pp. 302-311, 2007.